Abstract-A multitude of cyber vulnerabilities on the tactical edge arise from the mix of network infrastructure, physical hardware and software, and individual user-behavior. Because of the inherent complexity of socio-technical systems, most models of tactical cyber assurance omit the non-physical influence propagation between mobile systems and users. This omission leads to a question: how can the flow of influence across a network act as a proxy for assessing the propagation of risk? Our contribution toward solving this problem is to introduce a dynamic, adaptive ecosystem-inspired model of vulnerability exploitation and risk flow over a tactical network. This model is based on ecological characteristics of the tactical edge, where the heterogeneous characteristics and behaviors of human-machine systems enhance or degrade mission risk in the tactical environment. Our approach provides an in-depth analysis of vulnerability exploitation propagation and risk flow using a multiagent epidemic model which incorporates user-behavior and mobility as components of the system. This user-behavior component is expressed as a time-varying parameter driving a multi-agent system. We validate this model by conducting a synthetic battlefield simulation, where performance results depend mainly on the level of functionality of the assets and services. The composite risk score is shown to be proportional to infection rates from the Standard Epidemic Model.
I. INTRODUCTION
actical mobile ad-hoc networks (MANET), defined by Burbank et al. as "deployed networks supporting users and platforms within the tactical operations region", have become critical in supporting various task scenarios (battlefield, emergency response, social network, etc.) [1] . They are a key component to achieve technological and operational dominance in Net-Centric Warfare operations [2] . Tactical networks rely on the timely provisioning of assets and services across the network in order to meet specific mission goals. The ubiquity of ad hoc networks has increased their attack surface for malicious attacks that aim to degrade battlefield capability, access sensitive communication channels, and corrupt trusted systems on the tactical edge [3, 4] . This paper addresses the impact and influence of vulnerability exploitations by attackers in a tactical network. Our model of vulnerability exploitation is inspired by our observation that both tactical networks and ecological systems share functional and structural commonalities [5] . This paper shows how the concepts and simulation methodology of ecological risk assessment can be leveraged to develop (i) an ecosystem-inspired model of vulnerability exploitation and risk flow across a tactical network, and (ii) a multi-agent simulation system for testing and validation of the model. To motivate our model, consider the following example from ecological literature: in a natural environment, habitats possess transition zones that allow them to share critical ecosystem services and provide species environmental corridors through which they can access distant resources [6] . Loss, or failure, of a habitat zone via catastrophe (environmental disaster, contagion, etc.) often has physical and structural impacts well beyond its borders [7] . For instance, a species may be cut off from food supplies and cause chains of extinctions to occur as a result in seemingly detached habitat systems as result [8] . Similarly, in a tactical edge network, the removal or lowfunctionality of connected nodes may cause key services to fail or be degraded in neighbors [9] . This generation and distribution of risk by an environmental stressor is referred to in ecological literature as "risk flow" [10] .
Predicting and measuring the impact of risk entering a closed system is difficult [11] . Performing the same operation on propagating risk, which might arise from a wildfire or spread of a virulent pest or parasitic contagion, is complex and unpredictable. In large part, this is attributable to the nature of the exploitable connections between habitats, which are not explicitly spatial, but rather the result of a complex set of environment and species interactions that are often difficult to discern from a top-down or bottom-up perspective alone [12] . This paper presents an influence analysis metric describing the interactions between mobile nodes. This metric is drawn from the ecological concept of risk flow and incorporates user behavior and mission assurance parameters. We use this to measure the influence of contagion-driven node loss with respect to partially hidden spatial and temporal connections in a tactical network.
The remainder of this paper is organized as follows. Relevant work is discussed in Section II. Section III presents our risk model for tactical edge. Section IV provides how vulnerability exploitation and temporal impact can be assessed in tactical edge. Section V describes simulation model and results. Concluding remarks are made in Section VI.
II. RELEVANT WORK
Fortson highlights a number of deficiencies of common cyber risk assessment practices and highlights various objectives for impact analysis which include: documentation of dependency relationships; ability to show effects of timing and duration of attacks on cyber targets, and prediction of missionimpact [13] . Existing methodologies such as UML and DODAF are diagrammatic rather than computable [14] . Bayesian networks, influence diagrams, dependency maps are useful for presenting high-level views of independent system operations but do not represent the temporal nature of attacks [9] . Whiteman and others have proposed tools for performing cyber risk assessment which leverage simulation and automated mission-plan validation [15] . However these models have little use in predicting multi-stage propagating exploits [16] . Staniford et al. use the standard epidemiological models of worm-spread to evaluate effectiveness of various worm scanning techniques [17] . Zou et al. present a "two factor'' model that extends susceptible-infected-recovered (SIR) epidemiological model to capture the effects of human countermeasures and the congestion due to the worm spread [18] . These cyber modeling efforts abstract various model components, such as the network topology, distribution and activity of vulnerable hosts on the network, and specific host and network defenses in order to consider very narrow theoretical experimentation. We address the shortcomings of these modeling techniques by making use of a novel approach: ecological simulation modeling which incorporates biologyinspired roles and parameters within a synthetic battlefield environment [19] .
III. ECOLOGY-INSPIRED RISK MODEL AND PROBLEM DEFINITION FOR TACTICAL EDGE

A. Problem Statement
We consider a mobile network as a tactical edge that has mobile nodes, each corresponding to a vehicle and/or user with devices. Each device can have one or more assets (e.g., software, hardware, data, service). This network is represented as a directed graph, denoted = ( , ), where is the set of n vertices, and ⫅ * is the set of all directed edges representing the connections between nodes. A directed edge ( , ) from node i node j exists iff node can transmit to node directly. When an asset of node k is infected or exploited, this exploitation has the potential of influencing all of k's neighbors, based on their individual susceptibility. The propagation speed and intensity of this influence may vary substantially among nodes, depending on their resiliency vulnerability exploit in question. This vulnerability exploit is expressed as risk, which is defined as the measure of the likelihood and impact of cyber system failure due to an event. Risk is calculated as an influence metric for each directed edge ( , ) ∈ , such that represents the risk of vulnerability exploitation node exerts on node . The sum of influence from all outgoing edges at node i is denoted as and represents the risk flow node through node i.
Using this measure we are able to address three problems: Problem 1: Characterize propagation of vulnerability exploitation over a tactical network, and then assess its corresponding risk flow over time by incorporating user behavior as well. Problem 2: Design a multi-agent epidemic model which incorporates user-behavior and risk flow to discover nodes which behave as risk controllers in systems under attack. Problem 3: Find and measure the risk flow attributable to one exploited vulnerability on each node as it propagates through the network.
B. Ecological Risk Model
In this paper we consider a tactical edge ecosystem model consisting of a small ad-hoc network in a theoretical geographical region which suffers periodic attacks from a selfreplicating computer worm. This worm targets mission-critical services on a handset device carried by each warfighter, denying the warfighter use of the asset while attempting to compromise neighbors.
The entire system is evaluated using modified ecological risk analysis model which calculates the directional risk flow on each connected edge of the network and the availability of assets and services across the network. The analysis of risk flow allows this process to identify risk controllers in the tactical network. The identification of these nodes provides a useful tool for targeting preemptive mitigation strategies to secure the network against outside attack or failure.
Ecological systems are often modeled as a series of compartments, linked by flows or transfers between them, with inputs from and losses to the "outside.", Ecological risk refers to the probability of an ecosystem suffering damage from exposure to some eco-environmental disturbance, or perturbation. Ecological risk assessment (ERA) is a quantitative evaluation of the risks associated with a possible ecoenvironmental hazard [20] . Its purpose is to generate scientific information for planning such that ecosystem damage and realworld costs can be reduced to a minimum [11, 21] . Ecological risks have two important characteristics: damage and uncertainty. First, these risks have the potential to cause longterm, and even irreversible, harm to the system. Second, they are stochastic and possibly cumulative or synergistic, and often difficult to forecast.
The ERA method is based upon the following basic formula of risk measurement from Nath [5] : = * where represents the risk of disaster; is the probability of disaster or accident occurrence; and represents the magnitude of impact, or possible damage, caused by disaster or accident.
Ecological impact, is often measured through environmental indicators which include: the total area affected by the disturbance, the abundance of vulnerable species in that area, and some measure of the harm per individual. It is helpful to think about the units and implications of this statement more formally with the equation: = * * where overall impact, , is defined as the product of the range size (in m 2 ) of a species, its average abundance per unit area across that range (in numbers, biomass, or other relevant measure per m 2 ), and , the effect per individual or per biomass unit of the disturbance. Critically, may also represent the magnitude of risk that is transferred to the system of interest if a specific disturbance occurs.
Cyber risk analysis (CRA) follows the same general formula proposed by Nath, where cyber risk is defined as the measure of the likelihood and impact, both real and functional, of cyber system failure [5] . To apply ERA techniques to the CRA domain we first recast the tactical edge environment as an ecosystem.
IV. VULNERABILITY EXPLOITATION AND TEMPORAL IMPACT USING RISK FLOW
The attack pattern is modeled after a self-replicating computer worm that infects host machines and periodically probes other nodes on the network in contagious disease-like fashion [18] . The spread of the attack, as well as the countermeasures taken to combat it follow the SIR paradigm, which can be represented via the following equation for a fixed population for size :
= ( ) + ( ) + ( ) where , , and refer to the number of susceptible, infectious, and recovered individuals at time , respectively. Additional parameters may be used to simulate natural population dynamics such as birth, natural death, and infection recovery rate. "Recovery" is assumed to be a simple patching operation that is initiated at the infected node after detection. However, recovery times may vary between nodes based on network connectivity, behavior patterns, and mitigation strategies.
A. Risk Flow
The composite of the system, mobility, and exploit model provides a view of the tactical network ecosystem that is amenable to identifying influence controllers within the network via control allocation theory. Control allocation is the difference of two pairwise integral flows that are normalized by the output environment (habitat compartment) of the dominator. In this sense, one system component can be shown to dominate or control the risk of the other component. In this configuration, the risk influence (transitive control) of one network node on another is determined by the aggregated risk flows which terminates at that controller.
As described by the basic ERA risk formula, ecological impact can described in terms of its magnitude. We define risk magnitude in the tactical ecosystem, , as the measure of cyber risk entering an ecosystem compartment at a given time interval t. This risk can be self-generated (endogenous), via such conditions as equipment failure, software error, and accidental misuse by a user. It may also arise from external sources such as other compartments (nodes) and the environment itself (exogenous). Risk magnitude is further separated into three parameters: risk intensity ( ), probability of risk occurrence ( ), and compartment sensitivity ( ). Together, these parameters determine the input risk value ( ) at a given node: = * * , 0 ≤ ≤ 1 where refers to the risk intensity resulting from the exploitation of vulnerability , refers to the probability of that exploit occurring, and is a constant representing the degree of sensitivity of compartment . This can also be expressed functionally as ( ). Taken together, risk magnitude becomes useful shorthand for identifying dominant compartments in tactical networks.
B. Propagation and Impact of Vulnerability Exploitation
To better understand the temporal nature of vulnerability exploitation in networked systems, we developed a vulnerability timing model for tactical network nodes based on hybrid failure propagation modeling. The resultant vulnerability timing graphs (VTGs) illustrate the temporal and probabilistic nature of system vulnerabilities that propagate between nodes. The VTG illustrates the timing window of events, = [ min, max ], as well the probability of propagation, ( , ). Because we are interested in propagating vulnerabilities common to internet-facing networked systems, we specifically define our exploit model in terms of an epidemic system. In addition, because we restrict our view of external risk to the impact of a single exploit on our nodes, we substitute for . This formula could be amended to contend with multiple competing risk factors by simply extending to , where represents all considered risk factors. Risk probability is represented by the aggregation of internal risk probability ( ) and external risk probability ( ) such that:
is a constant that represents the probability of hardware and software failure (potential user error), and represents the probability of external risk occuring. External risk is the aggregate of all incoming risk flows modified by node behavior parameters. In our model, is modified by explicit user activities, such as accessing email clients, downloading and installing software, and accessing assets and services on other nodes in the network.
Although the above formulas allow us to compute risk at a given compartment, we are interested in its influence or "flow" across the network [23, 24] . In this formulation, risk is not energy-or mass-based, rather it is informational in nature and is moderated by controller nodes. There are no absolute controllers in an ecosystem or other interconnected systems [6, 7, 25] . Instead, each element contributes to the overall complexity of system organization through various interactions with the other elements. Using Patten's work on Network Environment Analysis as a model, we describe risk flow between environmental nodes, as a function of the contribution of critical assets, or routing paths to assets held by another node, as well as the risk magnitude , which is subject to change as the battlefield environment evolves over time [25] . We formulate the risk flow ( ) by multiplying the input risk magnitude ( ) of compartment by the control exerts on . This influence is represented by the allocated risk parameter, . In this manner, all the risk flows that travel through the network can be explicitly quantified as follows:
= * , , = [0, 1, 2, . . . , ], 0 ≤ ≤ 1 where signifies the risk that compartment allocates to , and refers to the influence that compartment exerts on . The existence of a risk flow indicates that the donor compartment discharges risk it generated previously, whereas the receptor accepts risk from the donor with which it is naturally linked (Figure 2 ). Risk flows can be represented via directed graphs where the directed influence between compartment and is denoted as by ( ) = [0, . . . , 1]. Because all risk is assumed to be negative, larger values of represent higher risk probability of risk transfer between nodes.
C. Risk Influence
Influence ( ) is calculated as (1) a function of compartment criticality or (2) the contribution of a particular node toward the maintenance of mission-related functionality and required tasks. Using the structural hierarchy within the MTSA model, we first construct a mapping of mission-tasks to their required asset and services in-time. This mapping takes the form of a composite matrix, which combines the NS and NA matrices and computes a single influence weight for each edge between node i and j in the form:
represents whether node is using node as a router, represents the number of assets being consumed by node on node , and represents the number of services being consumed by node on node . and are calculated by comparing the list of all assets ( ) required by the services residing on node , with the list of assets provided by node ( ), where each instance of an asset is a singleton on its parent node. The subset is given as ∪ . Thus:
A similar process is used for calculating . We extend to include both the direct dependency between nodes ( ) as well overall network cohesion ( ). The adapted influence formula can be constructed as follows: = * In light of the above modifications and the calculation of , we can fully expand the formula for as follows: The weighted risk-flow matrix ( ) provides a temporally fixed snapshot of the risk propagating through the network at a given time interval (Figure 4 ). Because each node can be segmented into compartments, the ranked sum of each column of indicates the nodes generating the most risk, whereas the ranked sum of each row in shows the nodes experiencing the greatest risk-force. Schramski's network environment model proposes that the control and difference ratios between non-controlling and controlling nodes in an RF network be of magnitude 2 or greater [8] .When presented as a time-series, the evolution of this matrix reveals the dynamic action of an exploit or vulnerability as it spreads through the network.
V. SIMULATION MODEL AND RESULTS
In order to validate the ecological risk influence theory presented above, we designed an agent-based simulation model to test assumptions regarding the flow of risk between mobile nodes in a tactical network. This simulator, dubbed TActical Network Vulnerability Influence Simulator (TANVIS), is intended as a proof-of-concept to test the consistency of our simulation and its ability to differentiate between various riskstates inherent to known network exploit patterns. We focused on answering the following question via experimentation: How does mobility impact cyber risk propagation and cohesion in a tactical network?
A. TANVIS Simulation Model
Based on investigations of relevant literature and prior network criticality studies, we developed an agent-based simulation model of a theoretical networked battlefield. Borrowing concepts from ecological food-web analysis, we constructed an agent profile based on the capabilities and behaviors of warfighters operating at the platoon level. This profile consists of three hierarchical levels: individual, network, and environment.
To represent cyber risk propagation, a single exploit is introduced on a host machine inside the network. This exploit is modeled on the "Code Red v2" and "Slammer" attacks, selfreplicating computer worms designed to disable critical services while attempting to propagate by probing nearby vulnerable devices [18, 26] .
Mobility is assessed via a state-based implementation of the "Random Waypoint" model [1] . The terrain is represented by a two-dimensional lattice, the dimensions of which form the bounds of the experimental space. At each time step, a warfighter agent sets a new random vector and travel velocity depending on local conditions. This methodology provides a reasonable distribution of network topologies and common simulation platforms (such as NS2, WINNS, etc.).
The mobility model can be described as follows: at each time step, a node randomly chooses a destination and moves towards it with a velocity chosen from a uniform distribution, where = [0, max ] and max is the maximum allowable velocity for every mobile node..
B. Input/Output
The model consists of three hierarchical levels: individual, network, and environment. Individuals are characterized by the primary state variables: identity number, agent type, location coordinates, radio-range, battery power, security zone to which the individual belongs, base infection probability, base recovery probability, and composite behavioral parameters that affect the infection and recovery variables. Non-human operated assets (such as routers and sensors) have an additional state variable 'availability', which affects the ability of other agents to access their services directly. Both the latency and the loss rate of this WLAN are set to zero, but they can be made to vary with respect to distance, terrain, distance, and other environmental interference. The simulation returns a set of diagnostic parameters in time series including: RF-matrix, cohesion, and population data. The input parameters for the simulation can be found in Table I .
C. Scenarios
To validate correctness of TANVIS' exploit model, we draw inspiration from two well-known worm spread events on fixed networks: CodeRed v2 and SQL-Slammer. During the outbreak of CodeRed v2 worm, more than 359,000 infected hosts were observed by CAIDA. SQL-Slammer was first activated on January 25, 2003, starting from 05:30 UTC and infected more than 90% of vulnerable hosts within 10 minutes [18, 26] . During this outbreak, a total of 75,000 infected hosts are observed. In our model, we consider a considerably more concentrated scenario, consisting of only a few mobile squads of warfighters in a bounded environment. Tactical nodes are typically differentiated by equipment configurations (infantryman, radio operator, vehicle-mounted soldier, remote sensor, etc.) and their attendant vulnerabilities.
D. Results
In this section, we give some preliminary results for influence and cohesion scores for both mobile and non-mobile experimental models. These results are intended to illustrate the capabilities of our MANET model to accurately replicate the behavior of propagating attacks on tactical nodes, and they are not intended to be a comprehensive study of vulnerability exploitation on such systems. TANVIS also provides a graphical interface for monitoring active simulation and controlling playback of prior experiments. The values in Table  II show the effect of mobility on risk force, risk intensity, and network cohesion. Total risk force, shown in Figure 5a , follows a predictable pattern with respect to change in infected population predicted by the Standard Epidemic Model, with peak vulnerability occurring in network topologies with high levels of cohesion (Figure 5b ). This is understandable, because sparse networks create compartments that are isolated from exploit due to distance or complete inaccessibility. This phenomenon is common to topologies displaying small-world characteristics (most nodes are not neighbors of one another, but most nodes can be reached from every other by a small number of hops or steps) and low cohesion. The reduced risk force and intensity indicate a sort of topological resistance, which results in node mobility. Likewise, average risk intensity was lower in mobile networks as nodes dispersed prior to contact with infected neighbors as denoted in Table II . The average sub-network size for Random Waypoint was 4.6211 (compared with 12 in the fixed network), which is in keeping with reduced network cohesion due to node loss and migration. Figure 6 . Example mobile network results. Note service availability (top) is low, despite necessary assets available across network. This indicates that these nodes are disconnected.
We see similar patterns in service availability (Figure 5c ), with the mobile model retaining more up-time. Granular analysis reveals that although the spread of exploits are mitigated by mobility, service availability still suffers as the network disperses, and necessary assets are rendered unreachable as nodes become isolated ( Figure 6 ).
VI. CONCLUSION
This paper presents a dynamic ecosystem-inspired model for vulnerability exploitation and risk flow over a tactical network. This model treats user-behavior and mobility as components of the system, where user-behavior component is expressed as a time-varying parameter driving a multi-agent system. Vulnerability exploitation and risk flow is analyzed using a multi-agent epidemic model. The model is simulated using a tactical mobile network simulator (TANVIS) to enable investigation of mobility effects on the spread of worm-like exploits and their interactions with the man-machine cyber systems in a battlespace. Findings from preliminary experimentation indicate that mobility reduces risk from exploit propagation by reducing the risk flow across the network at the expense of decreasing network cohesion and increasing the risk of asset/service unavailability. Possible future improvements include the following: the development intelligent mobility models, alternative asset distribution across nodes, and advanced behavior models for individual warfighter agents. We intend to extend these simulation models with data drawn from a real tactical network for the purpose of cross-validation.
